The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) was introduced by the Federal Reserve to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and other collateral. We evaluate one aspect of the program-the extent to which it has narrowed repo spreads between Treasury collateral and less liquid collateral. We find that TSLF operations have precipitated a significant narrowing of repo spreads. More refined tests indicate the market conditions and types of operations associated with the program's effectiveness. Various additional tests, including a split-sample test, suggest that our findings are robust.
Introduction

On March 11, 2008, the Federal Reserve introduced the Term Securities Lending
Facility "to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and other collateral and thus to foster the functioning of financial markets more generally."
1 Financing markets play a crucial role in the efficient allocation of capital in financial markets and are widely used by dealers to finance their market-making, risk-management, and speculative activities. In early 2008, however, these markets became severely impaired. Lenders reduced the amount they were willing to lend against a given amount of collateral, demanded greater compensation for lending against riskier collateral, and halted lending against certain types of collateral altogether.
The TSLF is intended to address liquidity disruptions in financing markets by enabling dealers to swap less liquid collateral, which is harder to finance, for more liquid Treasury collateral, which is easier to finance. The facility allows dealers with a trading relationship with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, so-called primary dealers, to bid a fee to borrow a certain quantity of Treasury securities from the Fed for 28 days, while agreeing to provide other securities as collateral. Dealers can then use the borrowed Treasury securities as collateral to obtain cash in the private market. The economic rationale for the TSLF is captured by Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) , who demonstrate the conditions under which a government should offset a liquidity shock by swapping money (liquid securities) for less liquid assets.
We assess the effects of the TSLF by examining the extent to which it narrowed repurchase agreement (repo) spreads between Treasury collateral and less liquid collateral.
We do this by relating changes in repo rates and spreads to changes in the quantities of securities available to the private market because of the TSLF. We further relate these changes to the types of securities provided as collateral and whether a TSLF auction was undersubscribed or not, and we condition the effects on the level of repo rates.
We find that the TSLF has precipitated a significant narrowing of repo spreads. The narrowing we observe can be attributed, in particular, to higher Treasury repo rates as opposed to lower rates on less liquid collateral. We find that the results are driven by fully subscribed operations, operations at which a broader set of collateral is eligible, and operations conducted when the Treasury repo rate is far below the fed funds target rate.
Various additional tests, including a split sample test, suggest that our findings are robust.
Our paper is related to work by McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) , Wu (2008) , Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch (2009), and Taylor and Williams (2009) , that examines the effects of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) on term spreads in the unsecured funding markets. 2 While some of these studies conclude that the TAF lowers term spreads, Taylor and Williams find that the evidence of a significant effect is not robust. One reason for this, offered by Taylor and Williams, is because the TAF did not initially increase the net supply of bank reserves, with increases in reserves due to borrowing from the TAF offset by decreases in reserves from Fed sales of securities.
Our analysis of the TSLF may provide for a stronger test of liquidity facility effects.
First, borrowing from the TSLF does in fact cause a net increase in the quantity of Treasury collateral in the market and a net decrease in the quantity of other collateral. Moreover, the 2 Wu (2008) also examines the effects of the TSLF, but his analysis focuses on the TAF and term spreads. Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2009) describe the origins and design of the TSLF, but only look at the effects of the first 10 operations and do not perform a statistical analysis. Another related paper is Sundaresan and Wang (2009) , who examine the effect of Y2K options on Treasury liquidity premia.
overnight repo rates and spreads we examine are highly sensitive to the floating supply of underlying securities in the market on that day, and insensitive to expectations about future changes in supply, so that changes in collateral supply from a particular TSLF operation can be considered exogenous. In contrast, endogeneity may be a greater concern with analyses of the TAF, perhaps explaining why TAF studies employ varied empirical approaches.
Our paper is also related to work assessing the supply effects of government debt.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) show that the government debt-to-GDP ratio is negatively correlated with corporate spreads, which reflect a convenience yield investors attribute to Treasury securities. Greenwood and Vayanos (2008) show that the supply of long-relative to short-term debt is positively related to the term spread. Several additional papers show that Treasury issue sizes are positively related to yields on those securities (e.g., Simon (1991 Simon ( , 1994 , Duffee (1996), and Fleming (2002) ). In contrast to these papers, we relate the underlying supply of securities to the cost of financing those securities.
The paper is also related to work on the repo market by Duffie (1996) , Jordan and Jordan (1997) , Krishnamurthy (2002) , and others. Such work is primarily concerned with special collateral repos, which are transactions for borrowing and lending particular securities, as opposed to general collateral repos, which are transactions for borrowing and lending money. Effective security supply is an important feature of the "specials" market (see, e.g., Jordan and Jordan (1997) Treasury repo rates and finds that such rates support the expectations hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide background on the repo market, the introduction of the TSLF, and how the TSLF works. Section 3 explains the hypotheses we test. Section 4 describes the data used in our analysis, including descriptive information on the TSLF operations. Our empirical results are presented in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
The Term Securities Lending Facility
A. Background on the Repo Market
A repurchase agreement is a sale of securities coupled with an agreement to repurchase the same securities on a later date, typically at a higher price. A repo is thus broadly similar to a collateralized loan. As with a collateralized loan, the lender of funds has possession of the borrower's securities over the term of the loan and can sell them if the borrower defaults on its obligation.
A general collateral repo is one in which the lender of funds is willing to accept any of a variety of securities as collateral. The class of acceptable collateral might be limited to Treasury securities, or it might include other types of securities, such as agency debt securities. The lender is concerned primarily with earning interest on its money and of having possession of assets that can be sold quickly with minimal transaction costs in the event of borrower default. Interest rates on overnight general collateral repos are usually quite close to rates on overnight federal (fed) funds loans, reflecting the essential character of a general collateral repo as a device for borrowing and lending money. 3 A special collateral repo, in contrast, is one in which the lender of funds designates a particular security as the only acceptable collateral and is, consequently, a device for borrowing and lending securities. Special collateral repos are explained in Duffie (1996) , Keane (1996) , Jordan and Jordan (1997) , and elsewhere.
Repos play a crucial role in the efficient allocation of capital in financial markets.
They are widely used by dealers to finance their market-making, risk-management, and speculative activities and they provide a safe and low-cost way for mutual funds, depository institutions, and others to lend funds. The importance of the repo market is suggested by its immense size: primary dealers reported financing $4.5 trillion in fixed income securities with repos as of March 4, 2008.
Repos are also frequently used in open market operations by the Fed (see, e.g., Edwards (1997) The TSLF increases the ability of dealers to obtain financing, especially dealers relying on the repo market for financing of less liquid collateral. The ability of dealers to obtain financing through the TSLF should reduce the need for dealers to sell assets into illiquid markets to raise capital, potentially improving the liquidity of those markets. The ability to finance through the TSLF should also reduce funding pressures on dealers, reducing the likelihood of a loss of confidence among lenders.
The TSLF could also be expected to affect the functioning of financing markets directly. The exchange of collateral facilitated by the TSLF increases the supply of Treasury collateral in the market and reduces the supply of less liquid collateral in the market. The changes in supply should reduce the private market costs of financing less liquid collateral relative to Treasury collateral. Moreover, by providing dealers the opportunity to finance less liquid collateral, the TSLF should increase dealer willingness to make markets in the less liquid collateral for their customers.
C. How the TSLF Works
Treasury collateral made available through the TSLF is allocated via auction. The day before each auction, the Fed announces the par value of the offering amount, the particular basket of Treasury securities it is willing to lend, and the collateral eligible for delivery against the Treasury securities. Dealers may submit up to two bids. The minimum bid is $10 million, each bid can be for no more than 20 percent of the offering amount, and each dealer can be awarded no more than 20 percent of the offering amount. The auctions are single-priced, so that accepted dealer bids are awarded at the same rate, which is the lowest rate at which bids are accepted (also called the stop-out rate). The minimum fee for Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 auctions is 10 and 25 basis points (per annum), respectively.
The bid rate that a dealer submits represents the rate that it is willing to pay in order to borrow a basket of Treasury general collateral against other pledged collateral. The bid rate may therefore be considered as roughly equivalent to the spread between the financing rate for the pledged collateral and the Treasury general collateral financing rate over the term of a loan. It follows that dealers should have an incentive to participate in the program when the spread is greater than the program's minimum fee, but that dealers should rely solely on the private market when the spread is less than the minimum fee.
Shortly after the auction close, the Fed informs dealers of their firm's awards and posts summary auction results to the New York Fed's website. Loans settle on the business day following auction. Treasury collateral is allocated to dealers on a pro rata basis, so that a dealer awarded 10% of the offering amount receives a 10% share of each Treasury security 6 Schedule 2 collateral originally included Schedule 1 collateral plus AAA/Aaa-rated non-agency residential MBS, commercial MBS, and agency collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). Eligible collateral was expanded to include AAA/Aaa-rated asset-backed securities ( offered. The Fed reserves the right to substitute lent general collateral each day so as to avoid providing collateral that may trade with scarcity value in the repo market.
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To further mitigate credit risk, the Fed imposes a haircut on the collateral pledged by dealers, so that dealers must pledge collateral with a market value greater than the market value of the Treasury securities being borrowed. Moreover, dealers must ensure that the market value of their collateral remains sufficient on a daily basis. Dealers may therefore need to make collateral substitutions over the term of a loan if the pledged collateral deteriorates in value or falls out of the eligible collateral pool.
D. TSLF Options Program
On July 
Hypotheses
Our analysis of the TSLF focuses on repo rates and spreads, for which data are publicly available. Anecdotal evidence supports the conjecture that the TSLF has been effective at narrowing spreads. Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2009) , for example, present 7 The Fed selects securities for the collateral basket that are not trading with scarcity value (i.e., special) in the repo market, but repo market scarcity can change over the term of a loan, resulting in a substitution. evidence that the TSLF narrowed spreads, with the first operation, in particular, having an outsized effect. In this paper, we examine whether the continued experience of the TSLF, which permits an analysis with statistical rigor, reinforces that conclusion.
In particular, we examine how changes in collateral supply affect repo rates and spreads. 9 The underlying premise for the analysis is that an increase (decrease) in the amount of collateral available to the private market should decrease (increase) its marginal value, because of downward sloping demand, resulting in a higher (lower) repo rate. Repo rates for collateral not directly affected by the program should also increase or decrease, depending on the extent to which the collateral is a substitute for collateral that is directly affected. Operations occur weekly at the beginning of our sample, with the collateral eligible to be pledged alternating between Schedules 1 and 2. Starting September 17 (two days after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy), the frequency of Schedule 2 operations is increased to weekly (with Schedule 1 operations still held every two weeks).
Descriptive statistics for the TSLF auctions are reported in Table 1 operations, but are often at the minimum fees of 10 and 25 basis points, respectively.
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The high level of dealer participation at many operations is itself a positive sign.
An ongoing obstacle to the effectiveness of the Fed's discount window is that banks have been reluctant to use it because of a perceived stigma. The stigma arises from banks' concerns that adverse inferences will be drawn about their creditworthiness if their borrowing were to become known. The TSLF may have overcome this stigma because of its competitive auction format and expectation that a certain amount of securities would be made available.
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At the same time, undersubscriptions at other TSLF auctions may be indicative of improved market functioning and of the Fed having set the minimum fees at appropriate levels. The Fed set the minimum fees to be somewhat higher than the cost of borrowing
Treasury securities against program-eligible collateral in the private market under normal circumstances. As a result, dealers should only find it attractive to use the facility when the market is impaired. The facility is thus designed to be self-liquidating as market conditions improve.
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We also use TSLF options data provided on the New York Fed's website 
B. Repo Rate Data
Our primary source for repo rate data is the New York Fed's primary dealer survey.
Each morning, before its typical open market operation time of 9:30, the trading desk at the New York Fed collects information from each dealer on the average overnight general collateral repo rate at which it has financed its positions in Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and agency MBS, as well as the quantity of securities financed. These data are used to help gauge funding market conditions and to set spreads for the Fed's open market operations. We utilize data on the overall weighted averages calculated for each collateral type. We also use data on one-month repo rates, which are averaged from indicative rates provided by a subset of primary dealers for the same collateral classes.
A secondary source for repo rate data is Bloomberg. Bloomberg reports closing general collateral repo rates for Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and agency MBS for maturities of one day, one week, two weeks, three weeks, one month, two months, and three months. The source of the data is ICAP North America, a large interdealer broker.
Longstaff (2000) uses this data in his analysis of the term structure of repo rates.
C. Other Data
For robustness tests, we use the option-adjusted spread on the Merrill Lynch Global
Financial Bond index as a control for credit conditions in the financial sector. We also use
Treasury security issuance and redemption data from the Daily Treasury Statement in such tests to control for another important source of Treasury security supply and to provide an additional test of how underlying security supply affects repo rates.
Empirical Results
A. TSLF Effects on Repo Rates and Spreads
We test our first two hypotheses by regressing changes in repo rates and spreads on changes in the amount outstanding under the TSLF. In particular, we look at changes on the settlement days of TSLF operations. We focus on settlement days because overnight repo rates are affected by the supply of securities in the market on that day. 14 Changes in the amount outstanding under the TSLF are then calculated as the amount awarded in the TSLF operation settling that day less any amounts maturing that day from previous TSLF operations. Amounts outstanding include amounts exercised through the TSLF Options
Program.
To better ascertain the effects of the TSLF, we implement two controls in our analysis. First, we assess changes in repo rates relative to changes in the fed funds target rate, which tend to be immediately transmitted to other overnight rates. The results are virtually the same without this differencing. Also, all of our models contain dummy variables in our models for the last and first trading days of the calendar quarter, on which repo spreads typically widen and narrow, respectively. Again, the results are virtually the same without these variables, although the explanatory power of the models is lower.
Our initial regression results, presented in Table 2 , support our first two hypotheses.
The first column of results shows that changes in the amount outstanding under the TSLF 14 The announcement of an upcoming TSLF auction, even if it were a surprise, would not necessarily affect overnight repo rates that day, two days before the supply of securities in the market changes. Moreover, as mentioned, the announcement of the TSLF program itself did not seem to have a discernible effect on repo rates or spreads. Similarly, a TSLF auction would not necessarily affect rates that day in a particular way, although rates could be affected one way or the other if an auction revealed information about demand. In any case, auctions are held late in the day, long after our repo rates are measured, so any effect of auctions on repo rates would be expected to enter rates the following day, which is also the settlement day. 
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Note that an increase in financing rates for liquid collateral can benefit market functioning. Unusually low general collateral repo rates put downward pressure on repo rates for individual securities, increasing the likelihood of settlement problems (see Fleming and Garbade (2004, 2005) ). Concern that settlement fails might impair the ability of the Fed to effectively implement monetary policy provided the impetus for the Fed's original securities lending program in 1969 (Fleming and Garbade (2007) ).
B. Schedule 1 vs. Schedule 2 Effects
We test our third and fourth hypotheses by regressing changes in repo rates and spreads on changes in the amount outstanding from TSLF Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 operations separately. Options program draws on the TSLF are against Schedule 2 collateral, so amounts outstanding under the program are included with Schedule 2 amounts.
The results in Table 3 provide little evidence to support our third hypothesis. We hypothesized a negative Schedule 1 coefficient for the agency MBS repo rate in the third column of results. The coefficient is in fact negative, but insignificantly so. Moreover, the Schedule 1 coefficient for the Treasury repo rate, while positive, is insignificantly different from zero. Overall, Schedule 1 operations have little discernible effect on repo rates or spreads.
In contrast, the results in Table 3 provide strong support for our fourth hypothesis. Almost all of the paper's results, including those in Tables 2, 3 , and 4, support our fifth hypothesis. That is, changes in the amount outstanding under the TSLF have an effect on agency repo rates that is less positive than the effect on Treasury repo rates, but more positive than the effect on agency MBS repo rates. These findings are consistent with the notion that agency debt collateral is of lower liquidity than Treasury collateral, but higher liquidity than agency MBS collateral.
C. Conditioning on Level of Repo Rates
We test our sixth and last hypothesis by adding a term to our simple regression model in which the amount outstanding under the TSLF is interacted with the spread between the fed funds rate and the Treasury repo rate. The spread is measured as of the day preceding settlement, to capture conditions before the TSLF has an effect, and is calculated as the fed funds target rate less the overnight Treasury repo rate.
Our results, presented in Table 5 , support our hypothesis. The interaction term is significant in three of the models. The coefficient of 0.61 in the Treasury repo rate model, for example, means that each additional billion dollars in Treasury securities lent through the program is associated with an increase in the overnight Treasury repo rate of three-fifths of a basis point when the spread between the fed funds rate and the repo rate is 1%. The 16 Options program draws on the TSLF are included with the fully subscribed amounts.
effect is commensurately smaller (larger) when the spread is narrower (wider). In contrast, changes in the amount outstanding by itself are not significant in any model (with multicollinearity explaining why neither the amount outstanding nor the interaction term is significant in two models).
D. Robustness Tests
We next estimate our basic set of models on the two halves of our sample period, Table 6 , suggest our findings are robust. Changes in the amount outstanding under the TSLF have qualitatively similar effects on repo rates and spreads in the two sub-periods. The coefficients are generally somewhat larger and more significant in the first sub-period.
We then add two control variables to our basic set of models. One control variable measures changes in the quantity of Treasury securities outstanding, calculated as Treasury issuance less Treasury redemptions. Consistent with the TSLF amounts, our Treasury supply variable is measured as of the actual issuance and maturity days (as opposed to announcement or auction days in the case of the new supply). The Treasury supply variable serves two purposes. One is to control for other variables that affect Treasury repo rates and repo spreads, to ensure that the TSLF findings are robust. A second purpose is to provide an alternative test of Treasury supply effects on repo rates and spreads, as a robustness check of the more general hypothesis that Treasury security supply affects repo rates and spreads.
Our other control variable measures changes in the option-adjusted spread on the Merrill Lynch Global Financial Bond index. The index is intended to gauge credit conditions in the financial sector. Such conditions are likely related to repo rates and spreads. At the same time, the index is general enough that it is probably little affected by a facility such as the TSLF that is narrowly targeted to conditions in the repo market. To the extent changes in the amount outstanding under the TSLF do affect the corporate spread, measured effects of the TSLF on repo rates and spreads are likely biased toward zero in models that include the corporate spread.
The results, presented in Table 7 , suggest that the basic relationship between the amount outstanding under the TSLF and repo rates and spreads is robust. The TSLF coefficients are similar in magnitude and statistical significance as in Table 2 , although the spread coefficients are somewhat smaller in magnitude and less significant. The Treasury supply coefficient is significant and of the expected sign, indicating that increases in
Treasury supply tend to increase Treasury repo rates and decrease agency and agency MBS repo spreads. The corporate bond spread coefficient is also significant. Consistent with a flight-to-quality story, increases in the spread are associated with decreases in the Treasury repo rate and increases in agency and agency MBS repo spreads.
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We also assess the effects of the TSLF on monthly repo rates and spreads as opposed to overnight rates and spreads. One month maturities might seem more appropriate given that the TSLF lends Treasury collateral against other collateral for terms of 28 days.
TSLF effects on term rates are problematic to gauge, however, because the term market is less liquid and because term rates depend on expectations about future TSLF operations.
Nonetheless, TSLF coefficients in our simple set of models are of similar statistical 17 We also tested additional specifications including changes in the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), the Merrill Lynch MOVE index, and the S&P 500 Financials Index. Coefficients on these variables are sometimes significant when the corporate spread variable is excluded, but never significant when the spread variable is included. Moreover, the inclusion of these variables has little effect on the significance of the corporate spread coefficient or other coefficients.
significance when looking at monthly rates and spreads, albeit of smaller magnitude, as would be expected (results not reported to save space).
A final robustness test we perform is to utilize repo rate data from Bloomberg as opposed to repo rate data from the Fed. The Bloomberg data probably offer a less reliable read of market conditions because they provide once-a-day snapshots of rates from a single broker, as opposed to weighted average rates covering all the primary dealers. Moreover, the Bloomberg data are sometimes missing altogether, particularly for agency MBS repo in the month after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. On the other hand, the Bloomberg data are measured later in the day, as of the market close, and may therefore capture different information than the Fed data. In our simple set of models, measured effects of the TSLF using the Bloomberg data are stronger for the Treasury and agency repo rates and agency MBS repo spread, but weaker for the agency MBS repo rate and agency repo spread (results not reported to save space).
Conclusion
We find that the Term Securities Lending Facility is effective at narrowing repo spreads between Treasury collateral and less liquid collateral. We further find that the observed narrowing emanates from an increase in Treasury repo rates as opposed to a decrease in repo rates on less liquid collateral. Further tests are consistent with, if not supportive of, our additional hypotheses regarding the differential effects of the different operation types and of how the effects are related to market conditions. Additional tests suggest that our findings are robust to splitting the sample and to the inclusion of additional variables which influence repo rates and spreads.
Our findings of significant effects from a central bank liquidity facility differ somewhat from those of prior studies. Our analysis is particularly informative because the TSLF provides for a strong test of supply effects with minimal difficulties arising from endogeneity issues. The TSLF does affect the composition of collateral in the market, and overnight repo rates and spreads are highly sensitive to supply changes on TSLF settlement days, but insensitive to expectations of future changes in supply. Our findings of supply effects in the Treasury general collateral repo market complement those of related studies that identify supply effects in the outright Treasury market and in the financing markets for specific Treasury securities. The table reports the results of least squares regressions of daily changes in overnight general collateral repo rates (relative to changes in the fed funds target rate) and repo spreads (to Treasury repo rates) on the quantity of Treasury securities provided to the market via the TSLF, on the quantity provided via the TSLF interacted with the previous day's spread between the fed funds target rate and the Treasury repo rate, and on dummy variables for the first and last days of the calendar quarter. Repo rates and spreads are in basis points and security quantities are in billions of dollars, par value, and measured on the settlement date. The period of analysis is March 3, 2008 to February 27, 2009 . Coefficients are reported with heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent (Newey-West) standard errors in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table reports the results of least squares regressions of daily changes in overnight general collateral repo rates (relative to changes in the fed funds target rate) and repo spreads (to Treasury repo rates) on the quantity of Treasury securities provided to the market via the TSLF and Treasury issuance and redemptions, changes in the Merrill Lynch Global Financial Bond index option-adjusted spread, and dummy variables for the first and last days of the calendar quarter. Repo rates and spreads are in basis points and security quantities are in billions of dollars, par value, and measured on the settlement date. The period of analysis is March 3, 2008 to February 27, 2009 . Coefficients are reported with heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent (Newey-West) standard errors in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
